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BOOK REVIEW
Crazy Ideas and Fun Intelligence
Stories
JAMES J. WIRTZ
Vince Houghton: Nuking the Moon and other Intelligence Schemes and Military Plots
Left on the Drawing Board
Penguin Books, New York, 2019, 320 p., $26.00 (cloth).
The history of scientific, technical, or
social innovation contains a long list of
ideas that would have been viewed by
many at the time of their inception as
highly implausible, if not hare-brained.
Nevertheless, sometimes these far-
fetched ideas pan out. It was hard to
imagine that mold growing in a petri
dish might save hundreds of millions of
lives one day; now antibiotics can turn
what were once deadly infections into
little more than a nuisance. Likewise,
the idea that a computer would
understand voice commands was once
just the stuff of science fiction. Now
voice recognition software creates a
natural interface between humans,
personal computers, the Internet, and
the Internet of Things, despite the fact
that Siri would rather not talk about
what happened to HAL—the advanced
artificial intelligence system who
“decided” to disobey an astronaut in
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space
Odyssey. How about implanting a
microphone and a radio transmitter in a
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cat, creating a kitty-cyborg to eavesdrop
on the Soviets? The microphone
worked, but as cat lovers might suspect,
it proved impossible to direct the critter
against test targets. To be sure, then, not
every innovation equates to a success.
In this entertaining monograph,
Vince Houghton describes a host of
promising concepts, mostly embraced
by intelligence and defense officials,
that came a cropper, and now fill
history’s ash heap marked “dumb
ideas.” To be fair, Houghton notes that
the animal experiments, new
technologies, nuclear applications, and
intelligence and military operations he
surveys were all the product of
desperate times—moments when
scientific, intelligence, and military
organizations were under the gun to
solve a real threat or fill a gap in
intelligence collection or military
capability. Houghton also makes an
effort—albeit a lighthearted one—to
place these “innovations” in their
historical and strategic context. The
result is a lively read that not only
provides entertainment, but also a few
points worth pondering along the way.
It is possible to offer a few
observations about the contents of
Nuking the Moon without issuing a
“spoiler alert,” so to speak. Intelligence
aficionados and historians will not be
surprised by most of Houghton’s stories,
although they might note that at times
they are somewhat incomplete or even
misleading. For instance, Houghton
casts a jaundiced eye toward Operation
MONOPOLY—a Federal Bureau of
Investigation effort during the Cold War
to tunnel under the Soviet embassy in
Washington, D.C. to better listen to the
Russians in their workplace. Houghton
depicts the effort as a bit wacky, failing
to mention other tunneling efforts (such
as Operation Gold in Berlin that tapped
Soviet military communications), or
underwater cable tapping (such as
Operation Ivy Bells), which were equally
successful. Tunneling as a means of
intelligence collection was not an
absurd idea.
Of current interest to intelligence
professionals and scholars are the
failed ideas depicted by Houghton in
Nuking the Moon that will not go
away. For example, Houghton describes
efforts dating back to World War II
to use conventional and eventually
nuclear explosives to create and direct
tsunamis against enemy targets ashore.
Experiments revealed best practices
when it came to generating and
directing waves, although even megaton-
range nuclear weapons could not
generate waves of sufficient size to merit
the name “tsunami.” In any event,
detonating a large nuclear weapon over
a city will produce catastrophic
consequences, even in the absence of
spectacular water effects. Nevertheless,
the idea of a radiation-filled tsunami can
still be used to strike fear into the hearts
of those who hear it—witness Vladimir
Putin’s 2018 reference to a nuclear-
armed doomsday torpedo capable of
generating a 300-foot tsunami. Similarly,
the United States developed a nuclear
aircraft engine that would be capable of
extremely long duration flights. The
engine enjoyed a marvelous horsepower
to weight ratio, functioned well, and
only suffered from one minor drawback:
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the engine exhaust was radioactive. The
nuclear powered bomber was canceled.
Once again, Russian science appears to
have resurrected this old idea in the
form of a nuclear-powered air-launched
cruise missile. One wonders if the
Russians managed to solve the exhaust
issue, or why they would develop a
weapon with such an obvious drawback.
By contrast, not every failed effort
chronicled by Houghton proved to be
impractical or just dezinformatsiya: The
United States abandoned hypersonic
space flight vehicles in the early 1960s,
but those systems have returned with a
vengeance courtesy of Russian and
Chinese science. Indeed, technology
demonstrators can turn out to be very
dangerous things.
As one unpacks Houghton’s dustbin
of history, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that good ideas are
sometimes abandoned because of the
availability of cheaper technological
alternatives or a changing strategic
situation—and not because of some
inherent conceptual or technical flaw. As
strange as it may sound, it might be
prudent for intelligence professionals to
keep a list of crazy concepts, weapons, or
operations that failed or were abandoned,
as well as the reasons why these
programs never got off the ground. After
all, it is easier to train a dog than a cat.
BOOK REVIEW 3
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 0, NUMBER 0
